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A CULTURE THAT IS HARD TO DEFEND: 
EXTRALEGAL FACTORS IN FEDERAL 
DEATH PENALTY CASES 
JON B. GOULD* 
KENNETH SEBASTIAN LEON** 
Empirical research has exposed a troubling pattern of capital 
punishment in the United States, with extralegal factors such as race, class, 
and gender strongly correlated with the probability of a death sentence. 
Capital sentencing also shows significant geographic disparities, although 
existing research tends to be more descriptive than explanatory. This study 
offers an alternative conception of local legal culture to explain place-based 
variation in the outcomes of federal capital trials, accounting for the level of 
attorney time and expert resources granted by the federal courts to defend 
against a death sentence. Using frequentist and Bayesian methods—
supplemented with expert interviews—we empirically assess the processes 
determining the total allocation of defense resources in federal death penalty 
trials at the peak of the federal death penalty—between 1998 and 2004. Our 
findings strongly connect extralegal factors to the lowest levels of defense 
resources, which in turn correlate with a higher risk of a death sentence. Far 
from being idiosyncratic discrepancies, these are systemic and systematic 
extralegal factors that stand between a defendant and his opportunity to 
defend against a death sentence. Ultimately, we argue for a 
reconceptualization of extralegal influences and the relationship between 
local legal culture and capital case outcomes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 ruling in Furman v. Georgia1 and its 
subsequent 1976 ruling in Gregg v. Georgia2 prompted an explosion of 
scholarship surrounding the death penalty, with particular emphasis on the 
extralegal factors observed in sentencing patterns.3  Rather than entertaining 
whether capital punishment is justified in principle, empirical scholarship has 
focused primarily on disparities in the death penalty’s practice and 
administration.4  Contemporary social science research has firmly established 
“a pattern of evidence indicting racial disparities in the charging, sentencing, 
and imposition of the death penalty after the Furman decision.”5  In 
particular, research indicates that capital defendants are more likely to 
receive the death penalty if, among other factors, a) the defendant is black, 
b) the victim is white, c) the victim is a white female, or d) the defendant is 
poor.6 
Although these findings are consistent across studies, little work has 
been able to define and compare the effects of these four factors across 
jurisdictions and certainly within a federal system that is ostensibly uniform 
and less subject to the variation and issues observed in state-by-state death 
penalty systems.  While race effects are more salient than geographic effects, 
 
1  408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
2  428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
3  Lindsey S. Vann, Comment, History Repeats Itself: The Post-Furman Return to 
Arbitrariness in Capital Punishment, 45 U.  RICH. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2011). 
4  See infra Section II. 
5  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: 
RESEARCH INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES. REPORT TO SENATE AND HOUSE 
COMMITTEES ON THE JUDICIARY 5 (1990). 
6  Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime 
but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994); Sheldon Ekland-Olson, 
Structured Discretion, Racial Bias and the Death Penalty: The First Decade After Furman in 
Texas, 69 SOC. SCI. Q. 853, 853 (1988); Linda A. Foley, Florida After the Furman Decision: 
The Effect of Extralegal Factors on the Processing of Capital Offense Cases, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & 
L. 457, 457–58 (1987); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of 
Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 
105 (1984); Gary Kleck, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing: A Critical Evaluation 
of the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. SOC. REV. 783, 798–
99 (1981); Rory K. Little, Why a Federal Death Penalty Moratorium?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 791, 
807 (2001). 
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we generally know that the risk of a death sentence is higher in some states 
and regions than others and that charging and sentencing patterns in capital 
cases vary across urban, suburban, and rural areas.7  Existing literature has 
demonstrated that public support for and state-level use of the death penalty 
is influenced by an interaction of local crime rates and political ideology,8 
but the research has not yet been able to explain why those location effects 
exist or identify the driving mechanisms behind geographic disparities in 
capital punishment practices.  Certainly, we may have intuitive or anecdotal 
hypotheses for these differences—why, for example, “suburban counties 
with lower murder rates than urban counties send more murderers to death 
row”—but empirical studies accounting for exactly how these location-
specific differences in capital case processing operate are nascent.9 
The present study examines a different disparity in capital litigation—
the defense resources provided to indigent suspects—and in doing so expands 
our knowledge of location effects in the bulk of contemporary capital 
proceedings.  We focus on federal cases at the midpoint of the modern federal 
death penalty and examine the role of local legal culture10 and the subcultural 
elements of the courtroom workgroup11 that lead to widely differential 
allocations of defense resources and which, in turn, are closely tied to 
disparate sentencing at trial.12  More specifically, we advance a model of local 
 
7  Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on 
Prosecutorial Decisions to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161, 
178 (2006); JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE VIRGINIA GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (2000), 
http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt274.pdf; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 
Scattering Justice: Geographic Disparities of the Death Penalty, 
https://www.aclu.org/scattered-justice-geographic-disparities-death-penalty (last visited Feb. 
21, 2016). 
8  John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case 
Selection: An Empirical Study, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465, 500 (1999); see also David Jacobs & 
Stephanie L. Kent, The Determinants of Executions Since 1951: How Politics, Protests, Public 
Opinion, and Social Divisions Shape Capital Punishment, 54 SOC. PROBS. 297, 298 (2007).  
9  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 7. 
10  BRIAN OSTROM, CHARLES W. OSTROM, ROGER A. HANSON & MATTHEW KLEIMAN, 
TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS 46 (2007); Thomas W. Church, Jr., Examining Local Legal 
Culture, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 449, 450 (1985); Brian Ostrom, Roger Hanson, Charles 
Ostrom & Matthew Kleiman, Court Cultures and their Consequences, 20 CT. MANAGER 22 
(2005). 
11  DAVID W. NEUBAUER, AMERICA’S COURTS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 108 (9th 
ed. 2008); Jeffrey T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 
42 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 166 (2004); Geoff Gallas, Local Legal Culture: More Than Court 
Culture, 20 CT. MANAGER 23, 24 (2005). 
12  JON B. GOULD & LISA GREENMAN, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER 
SERVICES JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES UPDATE ON THE COST AND QUALITY 
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legal culture that relies on composite variables capturing place-based 
punitiveness, which also reflect the socio-political climate in which federal 
courtroom workgroups (e.g., the judge, prosecutor, and panel defense 
attorney) exist. 
By focusing on the federal capital process and within a common period, 
we are able to assess the extent to which there is arbitrariness (evidenced via 
the influence of extralegal variables) in what should be a standardized, 
nationwide adjudication process across all ninety-four federal judicial 
districts.  Further, using defense resources as the dependent variable and 
incorporating multiple measures for location effects in regression analyses, 
we can more accurately detect the extralegal roles of culture, geography, and 
courtroom workgroup characteristics in capital litigation, particularly since 
the governing law is essentially uniform across federal district courts. 
Our results suggest that a court’s decision to grant defense funding in a 
federal capital trial turns on multiple extralegal variables reflective of local 
legal culture and court administration practices.  With one significant 
exception—the type of charge filed—we find that defense resource 
allocations are not driven by legally relevant case facts, such as the number 
of defendants, offenses, or victims.13  By contrast, our research links the level 
of defense resources to the a) social and political climate in which the local 
court exists; b) average caseload and processing speed of judges in the 
applicable district; and c) background of the presiding judge. Even where our 
research finds a correlation between defense resources and the background 
and experience of the defense attorney, the relationship evaporates in 
regression analysis.  This finding, then, advances debate over the endogenous 
“chicken-and-egg” question of which courtroom actor most influences 
resource decisions—the defense attorney who requests court support or the 
judge who makes the decision.  Inexperienced lawyers may fail to request 
additional (or even sufficient) defense resources, but our findings suggest that 
it is judges, operating within the social and political bounds corresponding to 
the district’s local legal culture, that choose to appoint these lawyers and set 
the expectations and normative practices of representation in the first place. 
The result is a system of federal capital litigation that limits the 
resources that certain suspects receive for their defense based simply on 
where the case is brought.  Even in a unitary legal system with common rules 
for the provision of defense resources, systematic geographic disparities exist 
that rest significantly on extralegal factors.  When those resource-related 
 
OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION IN FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES 52 (2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fdpc2010.pdf (last accessed Feb. 21, 2016).  
13  See infra pp. 43–50.   
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disparities, in turn, are strongly correlated with the likelihood of a death 
sentences at trial, the integrity of the federal death penalty is subject to 
increased doubt.14 
In the following six sections, we present our research and discuss the 
implications of the findings. In the next part, Section II, we describe prior 
research on the death penalty, highlighting work that has found geographic 
differences in charging and sentencing at both the state and federal level, 
while also addressing the limited conceptualization of “location effects.”  In 
Section III, we provide background on federal capital litigation, including the 
procedures by which suspects are provided resources for their defense.  We 
also describe prior research that sets up the question for the present inquiry.  
In Section IV, we describe our methodology, explaining our dataset and 
hypotheses.  The bulk of the paper is contained within Sections V and VI, 
where we present the empirical findings and discuss their implications and 
significance.  We also try our hand at expanding the notion of local legal 
culture, particularly as it relates to capital litigation specifically and social 
science methodology more broadly.  In Section VII, we conclude by 
delineating the limits and caveats of our work and suggest avenues for 
additional research.  Notwithstanding the significance of the federal death 
penalty and the troubling implications of our findings, we do not wish to 
overstate our claims, given the limitations and specific time period of our 
data. 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE DEATH PENALTY AND LOCAL LEGAL 
CULTURE 
For some time now, socio-legal research has established that capital 
prosecutions, sentencing, and even executions vary disproportionally based 
on extralegal criteria.15  Foremost among these is race, typically conditioned 
by socioeconomic status.16 Perhaps the most famous study on this subject 
 
14  See infra Table Two.  
15  We use this term as did Kautt, meaning that the “sources of variation are considered 
illegitimate because no act explicitly recognizes them as legitimate. Specifically, 
‘geographical location would have to be seen as illegitimate to the extent that it does not reflect 
differences in offenders explicitly recognized as legitimate.’” Paula M. Kautt, Location, 
Location, Location: Interdistrict and Intercircuit Variation in Sentencing Outcomes for 
Federal Drug-Trafficking Offenses, 19 JUST. Q. 633, 635 n.1 (2002). See also DOUGLAS C. 
MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SENTENCING IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES, 1986–
90, Report No. NCJ-145332 at 54 (1993).  
16  William J. Bowers & Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination under Post-
Furman Capital Statutes, 246 CRIME & DELINQ. 563, 575 (1980); Bright, supra note 6, at 1883; 
Linda A. Foley & Richard S. Powell, The Discretion of Prosecutors, Judges, and Juries in 
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was conducted in Georgia by the late David Baldus and colleagues, which 
was considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kemp.17  
Although the Court refused to halt McCleskey’s execution in that case, not 
one of the justices in the 5-4 majority opinion contested Baldus, et al.’s 
finding that Georgia’s capital system was more likely to charge, and then 
sentence to death, black defendants who killed white victims.18  In fact, the 
Baldus study concluded that “defendants charged with killing white victims 
in Georgia were 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as defendants 
charged with killing blacks.”19  The controversy surrounding the Court’s 
decision in McCleskey is beyond the scope of this paper,20 but the key race-
related issues highlighted in the case were hardly limited to Georgia or even 
to the years immediately following Furman and Gregg.21 
These problems are further conditioned and aggravated by class and are 
generally more pronounced for defendants occupying the lowest rung of the 
socio-economic ladder, who may be “defended by lawyers who lack the 
skills, resources, and commitment to handle such serious matters.”22  As the 
New York Times has editorialized, “capital punishment [in the United States 
is] meted out to those without the resources to defend themselves,” and “poor 
people . . . are more likely to be charged with capital offenses.”23  Indeed, the 
provocative Stephen Bright has questioned whether the death penalty is 
“reserved for the worst crime” or “the worst lawyer.”24 
 
Capital Cases, 7 CRIM. JUST. REV. 16, 16 (1982); Thomas Keil & Gennaro Vito, Race and the 
Death Penalty in Kentucky Murder Trials: An Analysis of Post-Gregg Outcomes, 7 JUST. Q. 
189, 527 (1990). See generally CHARLES S. LANIER, WILLIAM J. BOWERS & JAMES R. ACKER, 
THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH (2009); STEPHEN P. GARVEY, BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA’S 
DEATH PENALTY (2002); Scott Phillips, Status Disparities in the Capital of Capital 
Punishment, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808 (2009). 
17  481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
18  See generally id. 
19  Id. at 286. Race is therefore an extralegal “defendant risk factor” on three dimensions: 
1) if the defendant is black; 2) if the victim is white, and 3) if the defendant is black and the 
victim is white.  
20  JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY (2001); David G. 
Savage, How Did They Get It So Wrong?, ABA JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2009 6:30 AM CST), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_they_get_it_so_wrong/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2016). 
21  Ekland-Olson, supra note 6, at 853; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 
5.  
22  Bright, supra note 6, at 1836. 
23  The Editorial Board, Countdown to an Execution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/16/opinion/countdown-to-an-execution-in-
oklahoma.html?_r=0.  
24  Bright, supra note 6, at 1883. 
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A. FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 
For all the prior studies on state-level capital practices, there has been 
surprisingly little research about the federal death penalty.25  One of the few 
studies comes from Cohen and Smith, who examined racial disparities in 
federal death sentences and described a broad discontinuity in the federal 
capital system, one that applies to defendants regardless of their race.26  As 
they note, the “geography of the federal death penalty is anything but 
uniform.”27  Of the ninety-four federal district courts across the country, just 
six account for one-third of capital authorizations,28 and more than half of 
capital cases come from fourteen federal districts.29  Rather than representing 
a uniform, national system, these geographic disparities suggest a similar 
patchwork of outcomes found in state capital sentencing, which prior 
research has linked to local social, political, and cultural forces.30 
If capital cases are disproportionately authorized in particular federal 
districts, actual death sentences are even more concentrated.  Although two-
thirds of federal districts have never seen a death sentence, upwards of forty 
percent of capital sentences are meted out in seven federal districts.31  Table 
One below compares the federal districts in which capital authorizations and 
sentences have been most concentrated, demonstrating that just four of 
them—Louisiana-Eastern (New Orleans), Missouri-Western (Kansas City), 
Texas-Eastern (Tyler and Texarkana), and Virginia-Eastern (Richmond and 
Northern Virginia)—fall into both categories.32 
 
Table One: Districts in Which Federal Capital Authorizations and 
Death Sentences are Most Concentrated 
 
25  AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 7; Songer & Unah, supra note 7; 
Raymond Paternoster, et al., An Empirical Analysis of Maryland’s Death Sentencing System 
with Respect to the Influence of Race and Legal Jurisdiction: Final Report, American Civil 
Liberties Union (2013), http://www.aclu-
md.org/uploaded_files/0000/0376/md_death_penalty_race_study.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 
2015). 
26  G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Racial Geography of the Federal Death Penalty, 
85 WASH. L. REV. 425, 429 (2010). 
27  Id. 
28  That is, cases in which the Attorney General authorizes the local U.S. Attorney to seek 
the death penalty. 
29  Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 429.  
30  Jeffrey T. Ulmer & John H. Kramer, Court Communities Under Sentencing Guidelines: 
Dilemmas of Formal Rationality and Sentencing Disparity, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 383, 384 (1996); 
Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 11, at 141. 
31  Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 426.  
32  Id.; see also GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 10. 
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Federal District Capital Authorizations 
(Districts together = 
50% of cases) 
Death Sentences 
(Districts together = 
40% of cases) 
California – Central X  
Districtof Columbia X  
Florida – Southern  X  
Louisiana – Eastern X X 
Maryland X  
Michigan – Eastern  X  
Missouri – Eastern X  
Missouri – Western X X 
New York – Eastern X  
NewYork–Southern  X  
Puerto Rico X  
Tennessee–Western  X  
Texas – Eastern X X 
Texas – Northern   X 
Texas – Western   X 
Virginia – Eastern X X 
Virginia – Western X  
 
How is it that a majority of capital authorizations are concentrated in 
fourteen federal districts but most of those districts (ten of fourteen) are 
unlikely to sentence substantial numbers of defendants to death?  Cohen and 
Smith report that the difference is not driven by the crime rate, because the 
“number of murders in a particular location bears little relationship to the 
number of defendants from that jurisdiction who are sentenced to death in the 
federal system.”33  There are other possible explanations, including the 
willingness of the local U.S. Attorney to offer or accept a plea or the expertise 
of local prosecutors in trying capital cases.34  Without additional data, Table 
One would appear to suggest that physical location is either a risk or 
protective factor when considering the likelihood of a death sentence.  We 
present an alternative explanation, one that has received virtually no 
consideration in the literature on the federal death penalty—the quality of and 
resources made available to the defendant’s legal team.35  We posit that there 
 
33  Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 431.  
34  Based on interviews with federal judges (interview notes on file with authors).  
35  Phillips has done a remarkable job of documenting the effect of lawyer type on 
prosecutors’ capital charging decisions and jurors’ death sentencing in Harris County, Texas 
(Houston). Scott Phillips, Legal Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 99 J. CRIM. 
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are measurable differences in “local legal culture” across federal judicial 
districts and that these varying customs or standards shape the normative 
practices and expectations for defense efforts across geographic space. 
B. LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE 
To the extent that researchers have considered the effect of differing 
geographic culture on court processes, much of the work has examined the 
norms of the “courtroom workgroup,” which generally refers to the working 
relationship between a local judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney.36  
Courtroom workgroup studies often prioritize the occupational nuances of 
how court cases are actually handled, as opposed to how they are presumed 
to proceed according to codified procedure.37  In the U.S., the adversarial 
court system presumes a motivated prosecutor is battling head-to-head with 
a dedicated defense lawyer, with opposing parties vigorously working on 
behalf of their party’s interests.38  However, research suggests that the 
difference between court processes “on the books” and those processes “in 
practice” is substantial, with the courtroom workgroup frequently being far 
from adversarial; the three courtroom agents generally know each other well 
and have personal and professional communications that are high in 
frequency, duration, intensity, and priority.39 
The courtroom workgroup develops shared understandings and values, 
creating an occupational subculture specific to that court.40 Together, the 
members cooperate in case processing (as opposed to case “battling”), agree 
on expected levels of vigor and attention in particular cases, and come to 
accept a common range of penalties for sentencing and negotiation practices 
for plea-bargaining.41  Rather than arduous opposition, the prosecutor and 
 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 755 (2009). As interesting as his findings are—showing that 
defendants who hired their own attorney were much less likely to be sentenced to death—they 
are limited to a single jurisdiction. Id. at 750. Moreover, as we explain in Section III, the cost 
of defending a federal capital case is so prohibitive that almost all defendants qualify for 
appointed counsel. 
36  Church, supra note 10, at 470.  
37  Christi Metcalfe, The Role of Courtroom Workgroups in Felony Case Dispositions: An 
Analysis of Workgroup Familiarity and Similarity, 50 L. & SOC’Y REV. 637, 637 (2016); see 
also Gary D. LaFree, Adversarial and Nonadversarial Justice: A Comparison of Guilty Pleas 
and Trials, 23 CRIMINOLOGY 289, 289 (1985). 
38  Metcalfe, supra note 37, at 638.  
39  THOMAS W. CHURCH, JR., ALAN CARLSON, JO-LYNNE LEE & TERESA TANN, JUSTICE 
DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 60 (1978); JAMES EISENSTEIN, 
ROY FLEMMING & PETER NARDULLI, THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR 
COURTS 27–53 (1999); Church, supra note 10, at 471; Gallas, supra note 11, at 25. 
40  Church, supra note 10, at 470. 
41  Metcalfe, supra note 37, at 638.  
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defense lawyer—with the cooperation and oversight of the presiding judge—
create their own courtroom-specific culture that likely varies across different 
workgroups.42  Through this lens, the courtroom workgroup can be 
understood as a unit that engages in case processing and that these units will 
differ between courts, and in this specific study, across federal judicial 
districts. 
These ensuing shared norms, seen as specific to the courtroom 
workgroup, have been called “local legal culture,”43 which reflects “the 
values and perceptions of the principal members of the court community and 
how they ought to behave and their beliefs about how they actually do behave 
in performing their duties.”44  But the term as commonly employed in 
existing literature still focuses on productivity measures and the quasi-
bureaucratic character of the courtroom,45 in part because the concept largely 
grew out of studies comparing case processing times for the purpose of 
understanding and improving court efficiency.46 
Legal culture, like any operationalization of culture, has diverse 
meanings.  Laurence Friedman has distinguished between “internal” and 
“external” legal culture.47  The former “refers to the ideas and practices of 
legal professionals,” whereas the latter reflects “the opinions, interests, and 
pressures brought to bear on law by wider social groups.”48  Under these 
definitions, internal legal culture is similar to the courtroom workgroups 
described by Eisenstein, et al. and Church,49 but external legal culture is too 
broad a concept to explain geographic differences in death penalty 
practices.50 
Kritzer and Zemans provide a definition of “local legal culture” that lies 
between the internal-external culture dichotomy of Friedman.51  To them, the 
 
42  Gallas, supra note 11, at 25; Kathleen Currul-Dykeman, Domestic Violence Case 
Processing: A Matter of Local Legal Culture, 17 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 250, 251 (2014); 
Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Christopher Bader & Martha Gault, Do Moral Communities Play a Role in 
Criminal Sentencing? Evidence from Pennsylvania, 49 SOC. Q. 737, 739 (2008). 
43  Church, supra note 10, at 450. 
44  EISENSTEIN, FLEMMING & NARDULLI, supra note 39, at 28. 
45  Gallas, supra note 11, at 24. 
46  CHURCH, CARLSON, LEE & TANN, supra note 39; see generally Church, supra note 10.  
47  Laurence Friedman, The Place of Legal Culture in the Sociology of Law, L. & SOC. 189 
(Michael Freeman ed., 2006). 
48  David Nelken, Thinking About Legal Culture, 1 ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 255, 262 (2014). 
49  EISENSTEIN, FLEMMING & NARDULLI, supra note 39, at 52; Church, supra note 10, at 
470. 
50  Nelken, supra note 48, at 262. 
51  Herbert M. Kritzer & Frances K. Zemans, Local Legal Culture and the Control of 
Litigation, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 535, 538 (1993). 
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concept 
reflects the complete set of norms and attitudes that govern the operation of 
a court system. Some of these norms are reflected in formal rules (e.g., time 
limits, discovery limits); others are the natural outgrowth of structural 
factors such as caseloads, numbers of players involved in the system, and 
the like; and still others are not traceable to formal procedure or structure 
but simply reflect a perception of “how we do things here.”52 
This description matches that of Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook who, 
in examining debtors’ behavior, defined legal culture as “systematic and 
persistent variation in local legal practices as a consequence of a complex of 
perceptions and expectations shared by many practitioners and officials.”53 
More recent scholarship has offered empirical and conceptual bridges 
between local legal culture and capital sentencing.  Kovarsky has analyzed 
state-level concentrations of the death penalty over a twenty-year period, 
finding that the geographic concentration of the death penalty is unrelated to 
the distribution of homicides.54  Kovarsky argues that there is a combination 
of “extreme bureaucratic path dependence” and multiple sites of local 
discretion exercised by courtroom stakeholders that drive capital 
prosecutions and sentencing.55  Fleury-Steiner, et al. specifically account for 
both race and place effects in their examination of “localisms” and “zones of 
racial exclusion” that, in turn, influence death sentences in Maricopa County, 
Arizona.56 
If some scholars have been able to describe local legal culture, socio-
legal studies still lack a broad understanding of the influence of extralegal 
and cultural forces on sentencing decisions and other case outcomes.  In the 
discrepancy between law on the books and law in action, there is little 
guidance on how best to account for extralegal factors less obvious than race 
and class.  As Songer and Unah noted in their study, “researchers have not 
sufficiently tested the effect of geography and local political culture on 
 
52  Id. 
53  Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of 
Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Federal Bankruptcy Courts, 17 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 801, 802 (1994). 
54  Lee Kovarsky, Muscle Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 
66 DUKE L.J. 259, 259 (2016).  
55  Id. 
56  Benjamin Fleury-Steiner, Paul Kaplan & Jamie Longazel, Racist Localisms and the 
Enduring Cultural Life of America’s Death Penalty: Lessons from Maricopa County, Arizona, 
66 STUD. L., POL., & SOC’Y 63, 71 (2015). 
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prosecutorial charging decisions.”57  The same is true for jury verdicts, 
sentencing, or judges’ procedural decisions.58  Much of the reason is that the 
concept is under-theorized in the literature.  Certainly, it is plausible that 
elected prosecutors or judges would be influenced by the “norms and 
attitudes toward criminal punishment” in the surrounding community and 
that, despite being courtroom agents, they are not immune from state, county, 
and court-specific cultures, and normative understandings.59 
Local legal culture may be under-theorized for a simple logistical 
reason: the unavailability of data.  We find that existing scholarship 
examining local legal culture often emphasize courtroom productivity 
measures, in part (or perhaps) because those data are readily available, 
quantitative in nature, and readily translatable into a practitioner-oriented 
problem.  The study of culture differs from a study of courtroom workgroup 
productivity, and cultural studies from any disciplinary vantage point involve 
working from a qualitative, ethnographic, and/or mixed methods paradigm, 
which may be methodologically and logistically challenging to some 
scholars.60 For these and other reasons, it is understandably difficult to obtain 
access to those judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys whose 
occupational culture we aim to better understand. 
This study recognizes that courtroom workgroups and the people that 
enter federal courts do not exist in a vacuum.  Despite a federal process that 
is ostensibly consistent and standardized across the country, there are social 
and political differences that vary across space and can be understood as 
constituting elements of local legal culture.  Indeed, it would be unreasonable 
to believe that the federal courtroom workgroup in—for the sake of 
example—Birmingham, Alabama, will not differ from a workgroup in New 
York City on variables related to social, political, and cultural climate.  
Whereas federal law and case procedures are written on the books in a way 
that is independent of geography, the existing but nascent body of research 
on local and regional culture could benefit from a more nuanced 
understanding of these subtle yet institutionally embedded extralegal 
variables that may significantly sway a decision regarding life or death.  One 
of the challenges, then—and the purpose of our study—is to determine what 
those untraceable influences might be and model their effects.  Relying on a 
combination of quantitative (both frequentist and Bayesian statistics) and 
qualitative methods, this study examines the relationship between local legal 
culture and resource allocation for capital cases at the federal level. 
 
57  Songer & Unah, supra note 7, at 178. 
58  Blume & Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 467. 
59  Songer & Unah, supra note 7, at 178. 
60  See generally Church, supra note 10, at 487. 
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III. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY PROCESS 
In order to contextualize the methods and data sections that follow, we 
offer a brief description of the process for authorizing and defending federal 
capital cases.  The federal death penalty goes back to before the first 
Congress, yet, as one author explains, “the current generation of [the federal 
death penalty has] been in business” for only the last twenty years.61  During 
that time, the number of death-eligible federal capital defendants surged.62  
Whereas there were only twenty-six such defendants in 1993, the number 
jumped to sixty-three in 1994 and to an annual number upwards of 150 in 
every subsequent year through the end of the decade.63  However, the 
Attorney General has consistently sought the death penalty in fewer than half 
of cases eligible for a capital prosecution.64 
The funnel of federal capital cases narrows further if one compares the 
number of capital-authorized cases that go to trial versus those that result in 
a guilty plea.  In the twenty years from 1989 to 2009, the Department of 
Justice (“DOJ”) authorized capital prosecutions against 465 defendants, yet 
only 262 of them, or about half, were tried.65  Many of the rest pled guilty 
and accepted a sentence of life in prison or even a term of years.66  Just sixty-
eight defendants were sentenced to death at trial.67  That figure represents 
26% of defendants tried for capital murder, 15% of defendants authorized by 
DOJ for a capital prosecution, and a mere 2% of defendants who allegedly 
committed a capital-eligible crime.68 
A. FEDERAL CAPITAL DEFENSE 
Outside of capital defense circles, little is known about the process of 
appointing and supporting attorneys who represent federal capital 
defendants.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3005, defendants charged with a federal 
capital-eligible crime are entitled to two attorneys, at least one of whom is 
 
61  Rory Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the 
Department of Justice’s Role, 3 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 350 (1998). For a historical reference, 
see HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 3 (1982).  
62  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 14, at 4. 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 85.  
65  Id. at 7–8. 
66  Id. at 10, 12. 
67  Even that number includes two defendants sentenced to death by jurors but whose 
sentences the trial judge overturned on a motion for a new trial. GOULD & GREENMAN, supra 
note 12, at 10. 
68  Id. at 12.  
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required to be “learned in the law applicable to capital cases.”69  In practice, 
because federal capital litigation is so extensive and expensive, virtually all 
defendants qualify for the appointment of government-provided attorneys 
under federal law.70  In some federal districts, the local federal public 
defender’s office provides representation, but most capital defendants are 
appointed a “panel attorney.”71  These lawyers, who are in private practice, 
have agreed to take capital cases, for which they are selected and paid by the 
presiding judge, who also determines the financial resources that will be 
made available for the panel attorney’s defense efforts.72 
Panel attorneys must submit vouchers for their time and that of any 
assistants or experts they employ in the case, with judges reviewing the bills 
and either approving or revising the amounts and services.73  Some courts 
now employ case budgeting attorneys, who serve as intermediaries between 
counsel and the court and also assist lawyers in creating a budget at the start 
of the representation, which judges can then approve.74  The judge is the 
arbiter in a variety of capacities; whether the attorney simply wishes to 
employ a paralegal or investigator or needs to engage a forensic psychologist, 
ballistics expert, or jury consultant for an aspect of the case, the categorical 
request and financial amount must be presented to and approved by the 
judge.75 
The defense of death penalty cases is significantly more expensive than 
for non-capital cases, and this applies to both state and federal proceedings.76  
Examining cases from 1998-2004, the period during which the federal death 
penalty was sought most often, federal defendants received a median $44,809 
in attorney time and expert services to defend themselves in cases that were 
capital-eligible but for which the Department of Justice did not seek the death 
 
69  18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994). 
70  See 18 U.S.C § 3599 (2008) (providing counsel to indigent defendants in federal capital 
cases). 
71  Not only can capital cases overwhelm the caseload of a federal defender’s office 
(“FDO”), but an FDO may have a conflict of interest with a co-defendant or not employ 
lawyers who qualify for capital representation. Id.  
72  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 17–18. 
73  Id. at 59, 70. 
74  Id. at 69–70. 
75  Id. at 69. 
76  While an exhaustive state-by-state overview is beyond the scope of this paper, in 
Maryland alone, researchers at the Urban Institute found that among 1,000+ capital eligible 
cases, the total cost of prosecuting averaged 1.9 million dollars more than a case in which the 
death penalty was not sought. JOHN ROMAN ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CENTER, THE 
COST OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN MARYLAND III (Mar. 2008), 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/CostsDPMaryland.pdf; see also GOULD & GREENMAN, 
supra note 12. 
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penalty.77  By contrast, when the DOJ authorized a case for capital 
prosecution, defense resources averaged $200,933 in cases completed by plea 
and $465,602 for those resolved by trial.78  These differences are hardly 
surprising.  By virtue of the possible penalty at stake, capital cases warrant 
greater attorney time and investigative effort.  Moreover, a capital case 
actually involves two trials.79  In the first, the parties litigate the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant. Only if the defendant is convicted of a capital 
charge does the trial move to the penalty or sentencing phase, in which the 
prosecution seeks to explain why the defendant should be sentenced to death 
while the defense presents mitigating evidence to convince jurors to deliver 
a sentence of life without the possibility of release.80 
B. DISPARITIES IN DEFENSE RESOURCES 
To our knowledge, there have been only two national studies that have 
examined the cost and quality of capital defense resources in the post-Federal 
Death Penalty Act (“FDPA”) era.  Both studies were commissioned by the 
Committee on Defender Services of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States.81  Although that second study was intended as an evaluation project, 
it reached two conclusions that were both troubling and relevant for the 
present study.  Examining the attorney time and expert resources provided to 
federal capital defendants at trial, the study found considerable regional 
differences in the level of funds afforded defendants.82  Particular federal 
districts, including those in Georgia, Texas, and North Carolina, were likely 
to provide lower levels of defense support, while those in places like 
Connecticut, California, and the District of Columbia afforded capital 
defendants greater defense resources.83  Moreover, the level of support was 
correlated with case outcomes and was statistically unrelated to the bulk of 
 
77  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 84. 
78  Id. at 25. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. at 77. See generally UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL 
DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR 
CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (Jun. 6, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/pubdoc/ 
deathpenaltystudy.htm.  
81 See, e.g., James R. Spencer, Robin J. Cauthron & Nancy G. Edmunds, FEDERAL 
DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (May 1998), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
uncategorized/Death_Penalty_Representation/Standards/National/federal_judicial_conferenc
e_recommendations.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2015); GOULD & GREENMAN, 
supra note 12, at 51. 
82  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12 at 51. 
83 Id. at 51–52. 
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the legally relevant facts of the case.84  As Table Two below indicates, 
defendants whose approved funds were below the 30th percentile of support 
(~ $320,000) were twice as likely to be sentenced to death as those with 
higher levels of support.85 
 
Table Two: Correlation between Defense Resources & Sentencing 
Outcome 
(statistically significant at .05 level) 
 







Lowest Resourced Cases 
(< 30th percentile) 
 
44% 56% 18 
All Other Cases 
(> 30th percentile) 
 
19% 81% 43 
 
These correlations should serve as a serious warning for those concerned 
about the fairness of the federal death penalty.  Certainly, on their face, the 
correlations in Table Two suggest that defendants denied attorney time and 
expert resources are at greater risk of being sentenced to death.  However, 
the field presently lacks sufficient data to move from correlational to causal 
analysis—that is, to conclude definitively that cost reliably predicts case 
outcome in capital trials.  To draw this conclusion, of course, researchers 
must account for both potential antecedent and intervening causes, such as 
the strength of the evidence available to prosecutors or the demographics or 
backgrounds of jurors.  Neither we nor, to our knowledge, others possess 
these data, and this point is revisited in the limitations section of the paper. 
However, it is possible to assess the determinants of a defendant’s 
resources at trial, those factors that influence how much attorney time and 
expert assistance a suspect will receive when defending himself against a 
death sentence.  In this respect, we can analyze whether those bases reflect 
legally relevant variables—for example, case complexity or a larger number 
of victims, each of which would suggest higher cost defense—or extralegal 
factors that should have no role predicting the level of a constitutionally-
protected service, for example, the race of the defendant or victim, or the 
 
84 Id. at 47. 
85 Id. at 44. 
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background of the judge.  After all, capital defense is safeguarded by the 
Sixth Amendment,86 Supreme Court precedent,87 and federal statute.88  The 
notion that defense resources would turn on extralegal or cultural factors is 
antithetical to these legal norms and the legitimacy of the federal criminal 
justice system itself, especially because the federal courts are considered a 
unitary legal system in which the prevailing law, processes, and standards are 
presumed to be common.89  Indeed, “the FDPA, the underlying congressional 
intent regarding federal sentencing, and the Attorney General’s capital case 
protocols, all indicate a policy of at least rough uniformity in the 
administration of the federal death penalty.”90 
In the remainder of this article, we analyze the decision to grant defense 
resources in federal capital trials, seeking, first, to determine whether the 
dividing line of low cost cases identified in Table Two is truly relevant and, 
if so, to explain why certain cases are lower cost whereas others fall above 
the 30th percentile.  As explained in the next section, ours is an empirical 
inquiry, involving cross-tabular, correlational, and regression analyses. 
IV.  DATA AND METHODS 
Data on defense costs are available for federal defendants represented 
by panel lawyers.91  Since these attorneys must file vouchers for their time 
and the expenses of their investigators and experts, the courts are able to track 
the resources provided and approved for the defense in these cases.92  Such 
data are unavailable for cases involving public defenders, who do not track 
or bill for their time, or for privately-retained attorneys, who need not share 
their expenses with the court.93  However, because 80% of all federal capital 
defendants have been represented by a panel attorney, information from 
panel cases is informative for understanding the vast majority of federal 
 
86  Bright, supra note 6, at 1836. 
87  See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–87 (1984) (establishing that the 
Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant reasonably effective assistance of counsel); 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–45 (1963) (holding that the Sixth Amendment’s 
guarantee of counsel is a fundamental and essential right in a criminal case).  
88  18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2008). 
89  Little, supra note 61, at 350. 
90  Id. at 452.  
91  The Federal Defender Services Office maintains an electronic voucher and payment 
system for panel attorneys.  See UNITED STATES COURTS, DEFENDER SERVICES	  	  
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services (last visited Mar. 27, 2017).  
92  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 119. 
93  See REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT, 
https://cjastudy.fd.org/ (forthcoming 2017). 
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capital cases defended during this time period.94 
We were able to obtain defense cost data for federal capital cases from 
1998 to 2004.95  During this period, 214 defendants were charged with a 
death-eligible crime and were appointed a panel attorney.96  The Department 
of Justice sought the death penalty for half of the defendants (n = 95).97 As 
noted in Figure One, our focus is the sixty-two defendants who went to trial;98 
unlike unauthorized cases and pleas, defendants in these cases faced the real 
prospect of a death sentence.  Although we could not select the years of 
available data, the period from 1998 to 2004 is an appropriate range, 
capturing the modern federal death penalty at its apex.99  Whatever 
procedures the federal courts used for the appointment and compensation of 
panel attorneys, these measures would have been both implemented and 
routinized by the years we now examine.  For that matter, the hourly rate 

















94  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 19. 
95  This information was legitimately provided to us on a confidential basis.   
96  In addition, DOJ authorized another twenty-four capital cases that were handled at least 
in part by a Federal Public Defender. Again, because cost data are unavailable for the work 
done by federal public defenders, these cases are excluded from the analysis. See also GOULD 
& GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 9. 
97  See infra Figure One. 
98  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 19. 
99  Id. at 17. 
100  UNITED STATES COURTS, DEFENDER SERVICES, APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL: THE 
DEFENDER SERVICES PROGRAM, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2016). 
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Figure One: Distribution of Capital-Eligible Cases, 1998-2004 
 
 
A. DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Our dependent variable of interest is case cost, or the level of monetary 
resources provided to federal capital defendants who were tried.  This figure 
is a combination of the time that defense lawyers dedicated to their clients’ 
cases as well as the amount of investigative and expert services that lawyers 
employed as part of the defense.  Case cost data are imperfect correlates for 
attorney effort or expert time, as the total expenses are affected by both the 
number of hours that each individual dedicated to the defense and his/her 
hourly rate.  However, at least in federal capital cases, attorneys’ hourly rates 
are set at a maximum amount, $125 at the time in question.101  Attorneys may 
bill at a lower hourly rate—which some junior lawyers did—but none may 
bill higher than the hourly cap.102  A separate analysis, which includes 
attorneys’ hours worked, shows the attorneys’ bills were an approximate 
match for their hours worked,103 giving us confidence that the case cost data 
are not skewed by differential hourly rates. Moreover, expert services 
consistently constituted one-third of total defense costs across cases, 
suggesting that we were seeing a common phenomenon and not one affected 
by pockets of especially expensive or bargain expert rates.104  As such, the 
 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Nor should this be surprising given that the hourly rate was capped at $125, an 
extremely low figure given the stakes of a capital representation. Indeed, by 2010, the 
maximum hourly rate for capital cases was $178/hour. GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, 
at 48. 
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integrity of the case cost data was verified.	  
A preliminary review of descriptive statistics shows significant 
variation in the level of defense resources provided to federal capital 
defendants.  Within the sixty-two cases that proceeded to trial during the 
period of this study, the median level of defense funds was $465,602.105  But, 
as Table Three indicates, the maximum amount was $1,788,246, whereas the 
lowest level was $67,366.106  The discrepancy between the median and mean 
suggests that the latter is upwardly skewed by expensive outlier cases, 
whereas the bulk of cases have costs much closer to the median.  Cost drivers 
and the mechanisms behind these differences are discussed in the Findings 
section.	  
 
Table Three: Total Cost for Defense Representation in Federal 
Capital Cases, Panel Attorneys in Trials, 1998-2004	  
	  
 
Cases Median Mean High Low 
Trials $465,602 $620,932 $1,788,246 $67,366 
 
B. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We collected and tested six categories of independent variables against 
defense resources, each representing different hypotheses for why federal 
capital defendants received the levels and types of services to defend 
themselves.  These categories included Case Facts, Local Culture, Judge’s 
Background, Defense Attorneys’ Experience, Court Performance, and 
Defendant/Victim Demographics.	  
1.  Case Facts 
We started with legally relevant factors—the facts of the case—which 
might be said to comprise the “null hypothesis.”  That is, if federal capital 
defense is consistent with the constitutional, statutory, and common law 
principles that protect due process and equal protection, we would expect 
differences in defense resources to reflect the varying complexities of the 
case facts, all of which would be legally-relevant variables.  For example, a 
 
is a “national market” for expert services, as defense teams often seek to rely on a few known 
and trusted experts when their clients’ lives are at stake. 
105  See infra Table Three.  
106  Id.  
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case that involves multiple co-defendants would require greater investigation 
and preparation (which translates into higher defense resources and case 
cost), as would a case in which a defendant is charged with multiple crimes 
along with murder.  Mass murders, too, carry an increased emotional impact, 
which the defense must be prepared to counter at trial.	  
Complex cases, therefore, are hypothesized to drive case cost upward.  
Given available data, we collected and coded six variables that reflect case 
complexity.  These include the number of defendants, victims, and offenses; 
the type of crime charged; the prosecution’s allegation of future 
dangerousness; and the victim’s relative blamelessness.  The first three of 
these variables should be fairly self-explanatory in reflecting case 
complexity.  Put plainly, the more facts involved in a case, the broader 
investigation needed and the greater defense resources required.	  
The fourth variable separates cases with more complex charges, 
specifically those involving a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), 
racketeer influenced corrupt organization (“RICO”), or terrorism—all of 
which constitute either compound liability or multi-defendant cases.107  
These more complicated charges stand in contrast to many other federal 
capital cases, involving murders committed on federal lands or in federal 
facilities or where a victim was transported across state lines.  Although no 
federal capital case is easy to defend, CCE, RICO, and terrorism cases 
typically involve multiple locations and witnesses that require additional time 
and personnel to investigate.108	  
We also tracked whether the DOJ alleged the defendant’s future 
dangerousness, a claim that prosecutors sometimes invoke as an “aggravating 
circumstance” to justify a death sentence.109  To be sure, the prosecution may 
be wrong about the defendant’s future dangerousness,110 but without access 
to the defendants’ full criminal histories or a variable to assess the emotional 
impact of the crimes charged, we used future dangerousness as a substitute 
measure for the extra effort that the defense team must undertake to challenge 
the prosecution’s argument for execution.	  
Finally, the sixth component of case complexity is a dichotomous 
variable denoting those crimes in which the targeted victim had no prior 
criminal association connected to the case.  Here, our intention was to 
 
107  Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The Transformation of 
American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 239, 241 (1993).  
108  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 38. 
109  See 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2012) (discussing aggravating circumstances). 
110  Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy & Jon R. Sorenson, Assertions of ‘Future 
Dangerousness’ at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates of Subsequent Prison 
Misconduct and Violence, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 50 (2007). 
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separate those crimes involving especially sympathetic victims from those in 
which the victim’s death may have been connected to his or her involvement 
in criminal activity.  This was done to account for the presence of many cases 
in which the victim and defendant were known to one another or involved in 
a similar trade or enterprise (e.g., organized crime or drug-related operation).  
Although we recognize that capital defense lawyers routinely must soften the 
jury’s impression of their clients, some cases take more effort than others.  
Cases of the so-called “blameless victim” are among the most resource-
intensive.111	  
Our justification for these measures of case complexity lies, in part, in 
the initial cross-tab examinations in Section V that highlight statistically 
significant relationships between increased case cost and the case complexity 
measures of interest.  Although it is possible that in a given case one of the 
complexity measures might be negatively correlated with case costs (as, for 
example, if multiple co-defendants testified against one defendant), our 
empirical assessments and previous literature connect our case complexity 
measures with increased case cost.112  Conceptually, we believe that, in the 
unique context of capital authorized federal cases, our measures of case 
complexity are valid as they prolong and expand the steps needed to 
successfully defend a case.  Ideally, we would have included other factors 
reflecting complex case facts, including the defendant’s intellectual 
disability, the strength of the prosecution’s case, and the witnesses available 
to the defense, among others.  However, much of these data were either 
unavailable or problematic.113  As a result, our analysis of case complexity is 
confined to the six variables discussed above: Case Facts, Local Culture, 
Judge’s Background, Defense Attorneys’ Experience, Court Performance, 
and Defendant/Victim Demographics.	  
2. Local Legal Culture 
It is challenging to model variation in a multifaceted and abstract 
concept like legal culture.  Here, our operationalization of local legal culture 
entails the direction and degree of punitiveness, which incorporates measures 
of due process and crime control.  Herbert Packer first articulated these 
dueling motives, which reflect, on one hand, procedural safeguards to prevent 
government overreach and, on the other hand, enhanced powers to speedily 
 
111  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 48. 
112  Id. at 37–38. 
113  For example, no independent measure exists for a defendant’s mental ability, the only 
marker being whether the defense employed a psychologist or psychiatrist and sought to 
litigate the question at trial. But that then conflates independent and dependent variables, 
which would confound the analysis. 
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punish the guilty.114  We see these concepts debated regularly when officials 
talk about preventing wrongful convictions or vindicating victims, and they 
are evident also in debates about the appropriate level of defense 
representation.115  Whenever people say that “a criminal defendant is entitled 
to an adequate but not an extravagant defense”—and we have heard these 
very words from judges—they are implicitly reflecting their preferred 
balance between due process and crime control, at least with respect to 
defense representation.116  These motives and competing objectives can be 
measured, and we find that they vary across space (e.g., federal judicial 
districts).	  
Past research on punitiveness offers a few possible measures for local 
variation, including regionally variant cultures of honor;117 political party 
affiliation and measures of empathy;118 conservative values among a given 
jurisdiction and the proportion of Republican seats in the jurisdiction’s 
corresponding legislature;119 and religiosity.120  Ulmer & Johnson conducted 
a series of hypothesis tests, one of which examined whether counties with 
more conservative political electorates will exhibit more severe 
sentencing.121  Their data did not support a connection between county-level 
political climate and sentencing outcomes.  Here, we were able to collect 
three variables reflective of local punitiveness, including a) whether the death 
penalty existed at the state level; b) voters’ support for the 2008 Republican 
presidential candidate among the counties clustered within each federal 
judicial district; and c) whether the federal judicial district was located in the 
South (4th, 5th, and 11th federal circuits).122  Previous studies have found 
 
114  HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–173 (1968). 
115  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Craig Bowman, Indigent’s Right to an Adequate 
Defense Expert and Investigational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 
632, 632 (1970); see also Fred W. Bennett, Toward Eliminating Bargain Basement Justice: 
Providing Indigent Defendants with Expert Services and an Adequate Defense, 58 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 95, 95–98 (1995).  
116  Based on confidential interviews. 
117  Dov Cohen et al., Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An 
“Experimental Ethnography”, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 945, 946 (1996). 
118  James Unnever, Francis T. Cullen & Bonnie S. Fisher, Empathy and Public Support 
for Capital Punishment, 28 J. CRIME & JUST. 1, 4–7 (2005). 
119  David Jacobs & Jason T. Carmichael, The Political Sociology of the Death Penalty: A 
Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 109, 117–18 (2002). 
120  James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, White Perceptions of Whether African 
Americans and Hispanics are Prone to Violence and Support for the Death Penalty, 49 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 519, 530 (2014). 
121  Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 11, at 141. 
122  We tried modeling this construct multiple ways, accounting for the fact that the 4th 
and 5th Circuits had policies at the time to limit defense costs. But, rather than being limited 
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that all three of these variables are associated with increased capital sentences 
at the state level.123  Given that members of federal courtroom workgroups 
live and work in these same areas, they would hardly seem immune to the 
socio-political cultures of their surrounding locales.	  
3. Judges’ Backgrounds 
There is considerable research suggesting that a judge’s background 
affects the substance of her rulings.124  Here, we were able to collect three 
variables reflective of a judge’s background, reputation, and style.  First, we 
coded the party affiliation of the president who appointed the judge, which 
serves as a marker for the likely ideological bounds of the judge.125  Second, 
we noted whether the judge had previously served as a federal prosecutor, a 
variable reflective of her experience in federal criminal law and presumed 
support for law enforcement and crime control strategies.  Third, we coded 
whether the judge had graduated from a nationally prestigious law school.126  
 
to two circuits, the variable had the most explanatory power when accounting for the 4th, 5th, 
and 11th Circuits. 
123  John H. Beck et al., Regional Differences in Chapter 13 Filings: Southern Legal 
Culture or Religion?, 72 REV. SOC. ECON. 186, 203 (2013); Cohen & Smith, supra note 26, at 
433; Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision to Seek the 
Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 779 (1983); Kleck, 
supra note 6, at 794; Unnever & Cullen, supra note 120, at 531. 
124  David Abrams, Marianna Bertran & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in Their 
Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 377 (2012); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, 
Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1117, 1156 (2008); Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence 
on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 179 (2013); Stuart S. Nagel, Judicial 
Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 333, 339 
(1962); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in 
the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1786 (2005). See generally KITTY 
CALAVITA, INVITATION TO LAW & SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REAL LAW 
(2010); ANTONIN SCALIA, INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONAL TEXTS, ARGUING ABOUT LAW 
(Aileen Kavanagh & John Oberdiek eds., 2009). 
125  We are well aware of the limits of this variable alone to predict a judge’s ideology, 
particularly at the district court level. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3–4 (2006); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. 
Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection 
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623, 624–27 (2001). However, there is broad consensus that a 
president’s political affiliation restricts the range of ideologies that would be considered 
acceptable among individuals appointed to the federal bench. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. 
Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of US Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
557, 558 (1989); Albert Yoon, Pensions, Politics, and Judicial Tenure: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Judges, 1869–2002, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 143, 148 (2006). 
126  Using a dichotomous variable distinguishing between the 15 highest ranked law 
schools as measured by U.S. News and World Report.  
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This last measure helps us in modeling a judge’s acculturation to national 
legal norms and best practices.  Imperfect as this variable may be,127 we have 
heard from multiple lawyers who complain of parochial judicial attitudes, 
which they contrast with judges who look to “national standards” for legal 
practice.	  
4. Defense Attorneys’ Experiences 
The Gould and Greenman study linked the level of defense funds in 
capital trials to the experience of the defenses lawyers involved.128  There, 
the research team recruited a panel of distinguished lawyers experienced in 
federal capital litigation and asked them to assess the level of experience of 
the lawyers represented in the dataset.129  Further, because the expert panel 
also was acquainted with many of the cases, researchers asked them to assess 
whether the attorneys had first been recommended for appointment by the 
local federal public defender or the Administrative Office of the United 
States, as required by federal statute.130	  
We have borrowed those same assessments for the present study and 
have added a third variable that reflects an attorney’s years of legal 
experience following graduation from law school.  Hence, our three variables 
for defense representation include an objective measure of years of 
experience, subjective evaluations of legal competence by distinguished 
peers, and an estimate for whether knowledgeable actors had recommended 
the attorneys for appointment.  Based on the prior work of Gould and 
Greenman, we predict that cases in which lawyers who have a long career, 
are well-respected by their peers and who were recommended by 
knowledgeable actors will have higher defense resources.131  That is, 
experienced and respected capital defense lawyers will be more likely to 
advocate zealously for the resources needed for an effective defense and will 
feel less bound by a local legal culture that might accept a lower level of 
effort.	  
 
127  The most compelling variable would ask judges to identify the norms or standards they 
seek to follow, but the expense and feasibility of such a survey are prohibitive. Instead, we 
borrow from prior research on regional accents, which finds that young people unconsciously 
adopt or eschew regional accents in their late teens or early twenties, which “is usually the 
time we come to some sort of decision about who we are.” Anthea Fraser Gupta, Accents, 
http://linguistlist.org/ask-ling/accent.cfm#reading (last visited Feb. 17, 2016). Similarly, a 
budding lawyer who chooses to attend a nationally prestigious law school is at least 
subconsciously identifying with national legal norms and practices. 
128  GOULD & GREENMAN, supra note 12, at 24–26. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. at 66–68. 
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5. Court Performance 
Median felony disposition time and the number of felony filings per 
judge are used independently to model court performance and how busy the 
courts are within each federal judicial district.  These variables help control 
for “backlog effects,” or the possibility that fewer resources are allocated to 
capital cases because the courtroom workgroup and other legal actors are 
burdened with heavy caseloads and, thus, do not spend significant time on 
any criminal case.  Alternatively, a culture of rapid case processing (e.g., a 
“rocket docket” effect) may be operating across all criminal cases if felony 
disposition times are short, independent of felony filings per judge.132  In 
these districts, it would not be surprising if defense resources were reduced 
across all criminal cases, not just capital representations.  To account for 
these possibilities, we pulled data from Federal Court Management Statistics, 
maintained by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, reflecting 
caseloads and case processing times.133  The number of pending cases per 
judge, criminal felony filings per judge, and the median times for both felony 
and civil disposition were averaged across a five-year period to allow for a 
cross-sectional comparison across all federal judicial districts.	  
6. Defendant/Victim Demographics 
Finally, we included dichotomous variables for race and ethnicity to 
verify whether prior findings that link race to capital sentences also prove 
true for defense resources.134  To simplify the analysis (and to be consistent 
with those prior findings), we included three dichotomous variables: whether 
the defendant is black,135 whether any victim was white, and whether any 
victim was white and the defendant non-white. Because two of these 
variables are, by definition, collinear, we tested them separately.	  
 
132  Tracy Bach, To Expediency and Beyond: Vermont’s Rocket Docket, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & 
PROCESS 277, 280 (2002); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal 
Civil Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225, 227 (1997).  
133  See generally U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/federal-court-management-
statistics. Because such data were not publicly available for the late 1990s, we drew them from 
the earliest available period, 2009-2013.  
134  LANIER, supra note 16, at 1155. 
135  African-Americans constituted a substantial majority of defendants in the dataset, 
compared to just 24% of whites and 14% of Hispanics. The comparison of African-American 
defendants to other races/ethnicities was statistically more powerful than other constructions 
(i.e., white vs. non-white defendants, etc.). We followed this same approach for the other two 
race variables.  
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C. QUANTILE REGRESSION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF “HIGH-” AND 
“LOW-COST” CASES 
Initially, we estimated the effects of the independent variables on total 
defense cost, asking whether local punitive culture (or the other independent 
factors noted above) are associated with the total level of defense resources 
provided in federal capital trials.  None of these variables had a statically 
significant effect.  However, in graphing total defense cost, we noticed two 
plateaus in the distribution, one high and the other low.  We, thus, explored 
the feasibility of a quantile regression, assessing whether the explanatory 
variables have different magnitudes of effect across the range of total case 
cost.136	  
Quantile regression allows us to examine a question that linear 
regression cannot: does local punitive culture have a different effect on low-
cost versus high-cost cases?  In other words, does the effect of local punitive 
culture (and other hypothesized predictors) vary throughout the distribution 
of total case cost?  As is the convention, quantile regression is used to 
delineate cut points—a case-cost floor and/or ceiling—to understand what 
range of cases may be most affected by our hypothesized explanatory 
variables.137  For this analysis, we employed decile quantile regression, 
examining the relationship between the explanatory variables at each decile 
(or 1/10th) of the case-cost distribution (in dollars).	  
Quantile regression was appropriate and suggested two powerful 
divisions in the data—the 80th and 30th deciles of the case-cost 
distribution.138  These deciles were selected on the conventional basis of 
observing the variation in the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates at each 
decile of the dependent variable’s distribution.  The 30th and 80th decile of 
the case-cost distribution showed significant magnitude and/or directional 
changes in the relationship between the independent variables in our model 
and the case-cost outcome.  This gives us confidence that they are important 
for understanding which cases are most likely to be affected by the allocation 
of defense resources.  These cut points make conceptual sense as well, 
reflecting what might be understood as “ceilings” and “floors” in the data, 
and matching what we noticed in the graph of total defense cost.  That is, 
 
136  See generally LINGXIN HAO & DANIEL Q. NAIMAN, QUANTILE REGRESSION (2007); 
Roger Koenker & Kevin F. Hallock, Quantile Regression, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 143 (2001). 
137  The quantile regression estimation equation is: yTotalCaseCost = βo(p) + β1(p) Local Legal Culture 
+ β2(p) JudgeTenure + β3(p) AttorneyQuality + βk(p) False.(controls) + εi(p) where super-script (p) indicates that 
coefficient estimates will vary at each specified quantile level (p). In this study, we employed 
decile quantile regression, examining the relationship between the explanatory variables at 
each decile of the case-cost distribution.  
138  Respectively, these cut points were $891,266 and $313,859. 
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representations over the 80th percentile might be understood as “high-cost 
cases,” whereas those under the 30th percentile could be considered “low-
cost.”	  
We went beyond quantile regression to better understand what factors 
predicted high-cost representations.  In a logistic regression using the 80th 
percentile as the dependent variable—that is, predicting whether defense 
costs would be above or below the upper quintile—the results were 
surprisingly straightforward, suggesting that the complexity of case facts 
helped explain the highest-cost cases. This is as we might expect: the most 
complex fact patterns require the greatest defense effort, both in terms of time 
and personnel involved, and, thus, are likely to account for the bulk of the 
most expensive representations.	  
D. HYPOTHESES FOR LOWER-COST CASES 
However, the division between low-cost and all other capital 
representations was much more complicated, turning both on local legal 
culture and many of the other independent variables described above.  We 
approached this puzzle systematically, utilizing eight hypotheses to explore 
why defense resources would fall below the 30th percentile—below the 
floor—in federal capital trials.	  
We begin with a null hypothesis, H0, which focuses on legally relevant 
factors, primarily the complexity of case facts.  Here, we hypothesize that 
cases with the least complicated facts would be associated with defense 
resources below the 30th percentile.  Again, this is a fairly straight-forward 
prediction: as case facts become more complex, defense attorneys and their 
staff must spend more time—and bill additional time—investigating the 
facts, and they may need to hire additional experts as well.	  
From there, our hypotheses look to other elements of the case as 
reflected in the independent variables we collected:	  
H1: Cases in judicial districts with more punitive local legal cultures 
will be more likely to fall below the 30th percentile for defense resources.  
Just as members of the public in more punitive areas may seek strict and swift 
punishment, we hypothesize that judges and other members of the courtroom 
working group in these districts may be reluctant to tolerate or permit an 
extensive defense.	  
H2: Cases in which the presiding judge was appointed by a Republican 
president, previously served as a federal prosecutor, and graduated from a 
less nationally recognized law school will be more likely to be below the 30th 
percentile for defense resources.  Here, we expect that judges with a more 
conservative orientation, who previously sought criminal convictions, and 
who may not have been acculturated to national norms of defense 
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representation will be reluctant to grant substantial resources to the defense.	  
H3: Cases in which the defense lawyers have considerable legal 
experience, are recognized by their peers as highly qualified, and were 
recommended for appointment by the federal public defender or the 
Administrative Office of the Courts are more likely to be above the 30th 
percentile for defense resources.  Following on Bright’s argument that the 
death penalty is reserved for defendants with “the worst lawyer,” this 
hypothesis assumes that defense lawyers with stronger credentials will spend 
more time preparing a defense and solicit more expert assistance to represent 
their clients.139	  
H4: Faster felony disposition time will be associated with an increased 
likelihood that cases fall below the 30th percentile for defense resources.  As 
may be true of all criminal defendants in so-called “rocket dockets,” we 
hypothesize that defendants charged in faster districts will face heightened 
pressure to move the case along, which in turn may limit defense effort.	  
H5: Increases in felony filings per judge will be associated with the case 
falling below the 30th percentile for defense resources.  Similar to the 
hypothesis immediately above, we expect that judges overwhelmed with 
felony filings will be reluctant to grant defense teams additional investigative 
resources or preparation time, which could slow down the movement of the 
case and, in turn, further clog the judge’s docket.	  
H6: Being an African-American defendant will be associated with fewer 
defense resources.  Just as prior research finds that African-American 
defendants face a greater risk of a death sentence, we expect that a similar 
phenomenon will prove true for defense resources.	  
H7: The presence of a white victim will result in defense resources that 
fall below the 30th percentile.  Cases in which a victim is white are associated 
with greater public outcry and pressure to speed the case along to a conviction 
and sentence.140  In turn, we hypothesize that defendants in these cases are 
likely to see their available resources fall below the 30th percentile. A 
corollary to this hypothesis presumes that the effect will be greatest when the 
victim is white and the defendant is not.  Researchers have postulated for 
decades that the criminal justice system assigns greater value to white than 
black life,141 and we expect that will prove true as well in capital defense.	  
 
139  Bright, supra note 6, at 1883. 
140  Chris Greer, News Media, Victims and Crime, in VICTIMS, CRIME AND SOCIETY 
(Pamela Davies et al. eds., 2007). 
141  See, e.g., DAVID BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL 
JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 140–197 (1990). 
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V.  ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
We tested these hypotheses initially using bivariate analysis to examine 
the relationships between the respective independent variables and low 
defense resources (as represented by the 30th percentile of the defense cost 
distribution).  Table Four below presents the results from cross-tabular and 
correlational analyses.  Overall, six of our seven hypotheses found 
preliminary support in these tests, as did one aspect of the null hypothesis.	  
Beginning with the null hypothesis—that low-cost defense is explained 
by “simpler” case facts—just one of the six possible independent variables 
showed statistical significance.  Whereas low defense resources do not 
appear connected to the number of defendants, victims, or offenses in a case, 
the potential future dangerousness of the defendant, or a victim who was 
involved in criminal activity, there is an initial link between the complexity 
of the charge and the resources provided to the defense.  Defendants charged 
with a continuing criminal enterprise, terrorism, or RICO offense were likely 
to receive higher defense resources, whereas individuals facing other capital 
charges were three times as likely to be in the low-cost category.	  
This last finding makes intuitive sense, in that complex charges require 
more thorough investigation, including witnesses who may reside in other 
districts or even outside the U.S.  However, it is instructive that none of the 
other variables reflecting the null hypothesis showed significant statistical 
promise.  This is significantly different than the high-cost cases, where the 
most complex facts required the greatest defense effort and thus cost the most 
to defend.  By contrast, the lowest-cost representations are not concentrated 
among cases with the least complicated facts, at least insofar as complexity 
is measured by the number of defendants, victims, or offenses involved or 
the nature of the victim or defendant.  To the extent that the null hypothesis 
has explanatory power—that legally cognizable factors explain lower-cost 
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Table Four: Bivariate Correlations or Cross-Tabulations for	  
Factors Associated with Low-Cost Cases	  
(< 30th percentile of defense cost distribution) 
 
 





Case Facts Number of defendants .04 —- .75 
 Number of victims -
.154 
—- .23 
 Number of offenses -
.178 
—- .16 
 CCE/RICO/Terrorism 21% 60% .005 
 Future Dangerousness 63% 70% .60 
 Uninvolved Victim 55% 40% .33 
Local Culture State w/ Death Penalty 95% 72% .04 
 GOP vote > 50% 72% 36% .009 
 South (4th, 5th, 11th circuit) 74% 30% .001 
Court Performance Criminal filings per judge .466 —- .001 
 Felony disposition time -
.434 
—- .001 
Judge Factors Former Federal Prosecutor 6% 32%  .03 
 Top 15 Law School Grad 6% 48% .003 
 Appointed by Republican 
President 
65% 28% .23 
Defense Attorney Distinguished experience 47% 76% .02 
 Recommended for 
Appointment 
29% 69% .006 
 Years of practice -
.154 
—- .33 
Race Black Defendant 79% 47% .01 
 White Victim 37% 49% .38 
 White Victim w/ Non-White 
Defendant 
32% 19% .26 
 
Our other hypotheses showed greater promise in the cross-tabular and 
correlational analyses.  Our primary hypothesis of interest—punitive legal 
culture—appears strongly predictive in bivariate testing.  Here, the three 
independent variables suggest that capital defendants face a greater 
likelihood of a lower-cost defense when tried in conservative areas, 
especially the South, which have greater attachment to the death penalty.  As 
we posited earlier, conservative, more punitive areas are likely to value crime 
control over due process.  It is not surprising, then, that capital defendants—
individuals tried for the most serious and often most heinous crimes—receive 
fewer resources to defend themselves and protect their liberties in those 
judicial districts in which the courtroom workgroups operate within and 
among these prevailing views.	  
The overall speed and workload of the courts were also linked to defense 
resources.  As hypothesized, defendants tried in courts with higher caseloads 
and faster disposition times received the fewest resources for their defense.  
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These findings could be indicative of a “rocket docket” effect, in which 
defense effort is limited as cases are pushed through the system.  Or, with a 
heightened caseload in these districts, judges might be reluctant to grant 
defendants extra time and resources to investigate matters as additional 
filings pile up.  Indeed, it is possible that caseload and processing speed are 
related, with greater filings forcing quicker disposition time.  Of course, this 
is another way of saying that defendants tried in jurisdictions with higher 
caseloads and faster disposition times receive shorter attention to their cases, 
and it is hardly a jump in logic to imagine that the pressure to speed up case 
processing creates a culture in which defense teams are encouraged—or must 
accept the expectation—to devote less time and effort to the representation.	  
The experience and reputation of defense attorneys were also associated 
with the court’s allocation of resources to their clients’ defense.  As 
hypothesized, defense lawyers lacking “illustrious” experience in capital 
representation typically mounted the least costly defenses, as were lawyers 
whose appointment to the case was not recommended by the local federal 
public defender or the Office of Defender Services.  However, a lawyer’s 
total years of practice were not associated with defense resources at trial.  
These results support the notion that capital defense is a specialized field, one 
in which those possessing focused and distinguished experience are able to 
devote greater time to cases and/or secure additional expert assistance in 
investigating cases and representing their clients.	  
Similarly, the background of the presiding judge was related to defense 
resources, although not necessarily as we predicted.  We hypothesized that a 
judge’s ideology would affect his willingness to approve defense funds, 
although this relationship failed to reach statistical significance in the 
bivariate tests.  Of course, this finding may reflect a limitation in our data, as 
we were forced to employ a blunt variable that coded the partisan affiliation 
of the judge’s appointing president rather than other measures that might 
have assessed the judge’s past voting or contribution patterns.  That said, the 
bivariate relationships suggest a relationship between defense resources and 
the national prominence of the judge’s law school as well as the judge’s past 
service as a federal prosecutor.  Judges who attended a nationally recognized 
law school were much less likely to have been involved in lower-cost cases, 
as were judges who had previously served as federal prosecutors.	  
We predicted that both of these variables would connect to defense 
resources, although we had the direction of the latter relationship wrong.  It 
turns out that judges who previously served as federal prosecutors were 
unlikely to be involved in low-cost cases.  Rather than limiting defense 
resources, perhaps these judges recall the multiple resources they had at their 
disposal to litigate cases as federal prosecutors and may support and even 
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encourage capital defense lawyers to conduct thorough investigations and 
engage relevant experts.	  
Finally, only part of our hypotheses about the relationship of the 
defendant’s and victim’s races proved valid.  As the bivariate relationships 
indicate, the victim’s race, whether on its own or in relationship to that of the 
defendant, was not statistically connected to defense cost.  However, the race 
of the defendant was statistically significant, as African-Americans were 
almost 1.7 times more likely than other defendants to receive a lower-cost 
defense.  This result is consistent with other research on the death penalty, 
which finds African-Americans are at greater risk of worse treatment and 
outcomes142 and also in line with scholars who contend that individuals 
holding less social power—as measured by race, gender, and socio-economic 
standing—receive fewer government resources and legal protections than 
those “valued” more highly.143  Indeed, the recent rise of the Black Lives 
Matter movement is a reminder that, historically and presently, African-
Americans have been treated by the criminal justice system as though they 
were less important than whites.144  If so, it would follow that, all things being 
equal, the defense resources devoted to a capital case when the defendant is 
black would be lower than when the defendant is white.	  
We also employed regression analysis to determine whether the 
bivariate correlations hold up in multivariate testing. Given the small number 
of cases in our sample, we used factor analysis to reduce the number of 
independent variables, creating single variables that represented local culture, 
judge’s background, and defense attorneys’ experience and reputation.145  
Along with these, we included existing variables reflective of the complexity 
of the charge, median felony disposition time, felony caseload, and race of 
the defendant and that of the victim.	  
Given our unconventionally small sample size (n < 100), we turned to 
Bayesian estimation to explore the statistical relationships between the 
independent variables and low defense resources.146  Mirroring the results of 
 
142  Id. at 625. 
143  DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW 21 (1976). 
144  Nicole D. Porter, Expanding Public Safety in the Era of Black Lives Matter, 70 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 533, 548 (2016). See generally Juliet Hooker, Black Lives Matter and the 
Paradoxes of U.S. Black Politics: From Democratic Sacrifice to Democratic Repair, 44 POL. 
THEORY 448 (2016). 
145  RAYMOND CATTELL, THE SCIENTIFIC USE OF FACTOR ANALYSIS IN THE BEHAVIORAL 
AND LIFE SCIENCES 52–71 (1978). 
146  The conventional approach to estimating regression models with a binary dependent 
variable is the multivariate logit model. However, logit models rely on maximum-likelihood 
estimation (“MLE”). MLE is based on large-sample theory, and it often performs poorly with 
small samples. Bayesian regression models are known to perform more reliably with small 
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the bivariate analysis, two independent variables were statistically significant 
at a confidence level of 95% and in the same direction as hypothesized.  As 
Table Five below indicates, cases involving less complex charges and those 
tried by judges with packed dockets were likely to receive the lowest level of 
defense support.  The first of these results may be of comfort to the courts, 
reflecting as it does a legally cognizable explanation for the provisioning of 
defense resources.  Yet, even if complex charges are unlikely to render a low-
cost defense, the converse need not necessarily be true, for even a so-called 
“simple” charge can necessitate extensive defense effort.  But at least as we 
hypothesized, defendants charged with the most complex charges were 
unlikely to be at the lowest level of defense resources.	  
Still, four other variables were within or at the cusp of statistical 
significance in the regression147 and raise questions about the distribution of 
defense resources.  As we hypothesized, defense resources were at the lowest 
level when cases were tried in a more punitive local culture, by a judge 
educated at a less prestigious law school, in a court with a faster docket, and 
when the defendant was African-American.	  
In fact, only two independent variables did not perform in the regression 
as they had in the bivariate tests.  Because other research has linked victim’s 
race to capital sentencing, we included the variable in the regression even 
though it had performed marginally at best in the cross-tabs on defense 
costs.148  The prior research proved prescient, as the variable showed strong 
significance in the regression.  Here, cases in which none of the victims were 
white received the lowest level of defense resources. At the same time, the 
composite variable for defense team experience dropped from statistical 
significance in the regression.  When controlling for the other variables in the 
Bayesian estimation, a defendant’s level of resources did not turn on the level 
 
samples, and thus, we rely on Bayesian estimation procedures here. More specifically, we 
employed a Bayesian estimator in Mplus using the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm. 
Simulation research has shown this estimator performs well with small samples relative to 
other estimation procedures. Tihomir Asparouhov & Bengt Muthén, Bayesian Analysis of 
Latent Variable Models Using Mplus, Version 4, 24 (Sept. 29, 2010) 
http://www.statmodel.com/download/BayesAdvantages18.pdf. Table Five, then, presents 
standardized regression coefficients based on Bayesian estimates for the model. 
147  In saying this, we recognize that we are including some variables whose p values were 
between .05 and .1.  We do not mean to over-claim.  But, because these relationships are close 
to .05 even with a small sample, because those p values are based on a one-tailed distribution, 
and because the regression results mirror those of the bivariate relationships that more than 
met statistical significance, we feel comfortable making these claims. See generally Roger 
Wasserstein & Nicole Lazar, The ASA’s Statement on P-Values: Context, Process, and 
Purpose, 70 AM. STATISTICIAN 129 (2016). 
148  Because there were not sufficient cases in each category of the variable, we could not 
test the relationship between the race of the victim and defendant in the regression. 
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of experience or professional reputation of his lawyers.	  
	  
Table Five: Standardized Bayesian Estimation of Defense 
Resources	  
(DV = 30% Threshold. N =64)	  
	  
 
Variable Estimate Standard 
Deviation 
P (one-tailed) 
Local Culture Factor . 012 .082 .05  
Judge Factor -.011 .087 .07  
Attorney Factor  .005 .067 .46 
Complex Charge -.481 .201 .02  
Felony Filings/Judge  .471 .184 .01  
Felony Disposition 
Time 
-.103 .073 .06  
Defendant Black  .094 .075 .08  
Any Victim White -.123 .071 .02  
VI.  DISCUSSION 
This last finding—that the level of resources a defendant received at a 
capital trial was not explained by the experience or reputation of the defense 
attorneys—seems, at first, surprising.  However, we must revisit the bivariate 
relationships to understand what it means.  The regression results do not 
suggest that a lawyer’s experience and professional esteem are unrelated to 
the level of defense resources his client receives at trial, for the cross-tabs in 
Table Four show that lower-cost defenses are concentrated among defendants 
whose lawyers were neither recommended for appointment nor considered 
especially qualified by their colleagues.  However, this relationship is not 
causal, as the statistical significance drops precipitously in the regression 
equation. It would seem, then, that at least one of the other independent 
variables explains the correlation between attorney experience and defense 
cost.  Or, put more simply, one or more of the independent variables 
determines the type of attorney appointed, which is then correlated with the 
level of resources the client receives.	  
This explanation makes intuitive sense given that attorney experience 
and reputation are linked to the other independent variables in separate 
bivariate tests.  As Table Six below indicates, these relationships follow the 
same patterns as those found for defense resources, with experienced and 
esteemed lawyers less likely to be appointed in conservative or punitive 
jurisdictions, by judges appointed by Republican presidents who did not 
attend the most prestigious law schools and in judicial districts with heavy 
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felony caseloads disposed of quickly.  That African-American defendants 
were least likely to receive top-quality lawyers is unfortunately consistent 
with a host of other research on the death penalty.149	  
	  
Table Six: Bivariate Relationships Between Attorney Experience 















State has Death 
Penalty 
73% 90% .13 69% 88% .1  
GOP vote > 
50% 
33% 70% .01 17% 75% .01 








30% 15% .21 31% 22% .45 
Judge Top 15 
Law School 
Grad 
46% 15% .02 48% 17% .02 
Felony Filings 
Per Judge 




.251 —— .06 .537 —- .01 
Defendant is 
Black 
49% 75% .05 50% 79% .02 
White Victim 41% 50% .52 38% 46% .53 
Complex 
Charge 
54% 35% .17 56% 38% .16 
 
Together, the bivariate and regression results paint a larger picture in 
which the forces that affect the type of attorney appointed in capital cases 
also influence the level of representation that a defendant receives in a capital 
trial.  In specific districts—those in more punitive areas, presided over by 
judges educated at less prestigious law schools, where the criminal dockets 
are busy or judges are willing to process cases hurriedly—capital defendants 
 
149  Bright, supra note 6, at 1839; BALDUS, WOODWORTH & PULASKI, supra note 141, at 
229–279; Bowers & Pierce, supra note 16, at 629. 
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are unlikely to receive the most capable or experienced lawyers, and defense 
effort, in turn, is likely to fall below the thirtieth percentile of resources.  That 
African-Americans disproportionately bear this brunt, whether as defendants 
or in cases in which the victims are predominantly racial minorities, is all-
too-familiar in the history of American capital punishment.	  
Why would this be so?  There have been hints at explanations from 
federal practitioners.  Shortly before he left the federal bench, Judge John 
Gleeson from the Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn) testified that 
“there are too many districts in which panel attorneys virtually never seek 
funding for investigations or experts.  As I understand the problem from 
speaking to defenders and panel attorneys around the country . . . it is a 
cultural understanding that they simply won’t be sought.”150  Other judges and 
lawyers have told us informally that they believe there are “capital defense 
deserts” across the federal districts in which “the local culture just doesn’t 
support the same level of practice as elsewhere.”151	  
To be sure, “capital defense deserts” may be as reflective of lawyers who 
do not seek resources as judges who do not grant them.152  Our intent is less 
to pinpoint individual responsibility as it is to establish that those deserts exist 
and that local legal culture, even in a unified federal system, influences the 
level of representation a capital defendant will receive.  To explore this point, 
we shared a summary of the results from Tables Four, Five, and Six with a 
panel of federal defense lawyers and judges to gauge their interpretation.  The 
group numbered seven lawyers and five judges, each of whom had significant 
experience in federal capital cases and who agreed to speak with us on the 
condition of anonymity.  None of the participants was told of the others’ 
involvement, and we did not share responses in order to avoid bias.  We do 
not claim that the group is representative of federal practitioners or judges, 
though the twelve come from diverse geographic areas and, in our judgment, 
are thoughtful on the subject.  Our intent in speaking with them was to test the 
plausibility of our interpretation of the quantitative data, especially in light of 
Judge Gleeson’s testimony and the other scattered but informal reports we had 
heard.	  
Collectively, the group not only supported our potential explanation but, 
with the protection of anonymity, was willing to go beyond Gleeson’s 
account.  As one lawyer explained, “Of course, this is about culture.”  He 
 
150  John Gleeson, Testimony to the Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act 
Program 9 (Jan. 12, 2016), https://cjastudy.fd.org/sites/default/files/hearing-archives/miami-
florida/pdf/johngleesonmiamiwritten-testimony-done.pdf. 
151  Based on confidential interviews.  
152  Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Justice Deserts: Spatial Inequality and Local 
Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 283 (2010).  
GOULD 10/10/17  5:43 PM 
2017] A CULTURE THAT IS HARD TO DEFEND 681 
continued:	  
How many times have we heard judges talk about providing a Chevrolet but 
not a Cadillac defense to defendants? That perspective affects so much of a 
capital case. I’ve seen judges—who come from conservative state courts 
where it’s assembly line justice—reach the federal bench but bring those 
same attitudes with them. They appoint lawyers to cases who are reluctant 
to challenge them or ask for multiple experts. The judges push the cases 
along, which is what they did in state court. It’s no wonder that these cases 
have lower payments. That’s a defense in name only.153 
	  
Others chimed in with similar explanations.  One federal judge said, 
“We know there are different geographic cultures in litigation.” He 
continued:	  
My colleagues in New York and Los Angeles repeatedly describe a ‘harder 
hitting’ private bar in civil matters. Why wouldn’t we expect these 
differences to extend to criminal cases? . . .  Is it a chicken or an egg? I’m 
not sure. But, whether the judge appoints a lawyer with whom he is more 
comfortable, or lawyers just gravitate to places where they fit better, I’m 
not surprised.154 
	  
We do not offer these responses as definitive evidence of their wide 
support or as absolute proof that the accounts explain our data.  But, they do 
lend greater credence to a unifying theory of local legal culture to explain the 
disparate level of defense resources in federal capital trials.  Even in a small 
sample of cases, the regression results identified multiple factors as 
predictive of lower-cost defense, and many of those variables hold together 
under a theory of divergent legal culture.	  
Yet, even if the results are not indicative of a larger cultural explanation, 
they show that a single practice within a unitary court system is implemented 
with tremendous variation, both in terms of geography and other factors not 
delineated by law.  This is not the same as saying that the provision of defense 
resources in federal capital cases is arbitrary.  Actually, our results show 
systemic and systematic differences in defense resources, variation that can 
be linked to specific, identifiable influences in a closed legal system.  It is 
worth remembering that the federal death penalty is authorized under a single 
chapter of the United States code, and it is litigated through a common set of 
 
153  Authors’ interview/research notes.  
154  Authors’ interview/research notes. 
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procedures.  Whereas states vary considerably in authorizing the death 
penalty and appointing and compensating defense lawyers,155 federal courts 
are ostensibly bound by a common set of statutes and practices.156  Federal 
law does not mean one thing in Oregon and another thing in Louisiana, for 
example.  Even if we accept some inevitable variation in circuit practices, it 
is not clear why in capital cases—a matter clearly evoking the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution—there should be such 
great variation in the level of defense afforded capital defendants, especially 
when those under an identifiable floor of support are at greater risk of being 
sentenced to death.	  
To be sure, the connection between defense resources and capital 
sentencing is correlative, not causal.  But, with few exceptions, none of the 
independent causes identified in this study is legally cognizable in setting the 
level of defense representation at a capital trial.  Under the Criminal Justice 
Act and clarifying Guide to Judiciary Policy, judges are instructed to 
authorize attorney and expert time for indigent defendants facing capital 
charges.157  Nowhere in those rules are judges called to differentiate based on 
the caseloads they face, the political climate of the states in which they work, 
or even more, the race of the defendant or the victim before them. Indeed, 
there is only one independent variable in the regression that would be a 
legally acceptable factor in setting defense resources—the complexity of the 
capital charge.  Here, at least, the results are as we might expect—defendants 
charged with more serious charges are unlikely to fall into the lowest 
category of defense resources.	  
There is a ready analogy among our findings to past research on the 
effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.158  In those studies, scholars 
found significant geographic disparities in sentencing patterns even when the 
Guidelines were in effect and presumably prescribed a narrow and consistent 
range of sentences for a given set of crimes committed by defendants with 
 
155  David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, Jr. & George Woodworth, Arbitrariness and 
Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State Supreme 
Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 138–41, 162, 169 (1986). 
156  ROLANDO DEL CARMEN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: LAW AND PRACTICE 2–11 (2010). 
157  See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2012); UNITED STATES COURTS, APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL: 
THE DEFENDER SERVICES PROGRAM, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-
services (last visited June 2, 2017). 
158  In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, creating the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, which in turn issued federal sentencing guidelines. The Guidelines sought to 
standardize federal sentences by promulgating matrixes combining offense levels, defendants’ 
criminal histories, and a narrow set of adjustments. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions 
in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 
(2005), the guidelines are now voluntary. 
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similar criminal histories.  To some researchers, geographic variation itself 
was proof of an unstated but powerful extralegal standard at play,159 while 
others examined geographic differences in particular sentencing practices, 
which they said could reflect “local implementation strategies at odds with 
national strategy.”160	  
As one scholar has noted, the “sentencing guidelines [were] premised 
on the view that criminals do have some claim to equal treatment.”161 That 
argument applies as well here, but the findings in our study are different in 
two important respects. First, they concern the ability of a defendant to put 
on an effective defense—which, by definition, is the very time in the criminal 
justice process in which the defendant is presumed to be an innocent suspect, 
not a guilty criminal.  Second, although some of the sentencing research 
addressed differential effects of the guidelines,162 our work addresses the 
likely sources of differential defense resources, sources that are, themselves, 
largely extralegal.	  
In a broader socio-legal context, this study highlights an assumption in 
some legal pluralism literature.  Whereas conventional legal pluralism 
scholarship highlights the effects of inter-jurisdictional overlap (between-
group differences), and the effects of multiple legal and law-like systems on 
social behavior,163 we find within-group differences at a common-
jurisdictional level.  Rather than comparing between distinctive death penalty 
processes in a federalist system (e.g., state-specific versus federal death 
penalty administrations), we examine how processes vary within a single 
system that is assumed to be uniform and consistent across space and across 
courtroom workgroup actors and agents.  Thus, unlike Cover—who prefers 
the “messy federalism” of differing state and federal court practices164—our 
findings are more in keeping with Garland’s conclusions about legal 
pluralism.165  To be sure, Garland was discussing the lawlessness of 
lynchings in the early twentieth century, whereas we have examined a formal 
legal process nearly a century later, but there are parallels in Garland’s 
 
159  Kautt, supra note 15, at 663. 
160  Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 137–38 (2005). 
161  Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 116 (2005). 
162  Id.; Bibas, supra note 160; Kautt, supra note 15. 
163  David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil 
Trial Court, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425, 426–31 (1980). 
164  Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 682 (1981). 
165  David Garland, Penal Excess and Surplus Meaning: Public Torture Lynchings in 
Twentieth-Century America, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 793, 810 (2005). 
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account that “community norms and the rules of state law competed for” 
control of the community.166  In Garland’s study, vigilante practices “were 
not . . . liable to be sanctioned,” because, while “violat[ing] the letter of state 
law,” they did not contradict “group norms” of the local community.167  In 
our work, the presumed consistency of a unitary federal system gives way to 
a “messier” picture168 “of conflicting powers and multiple authorities”169 that 
create place-specific differences in life-or-death matters.	  
We are not prepared in an article of this scope to address the 
constitutional implications of our results for, among other things, our intent 
is not prescriptive.  For now, we seek to address the influence of local legal 
culture in the provision of defense resources and that effect on federal capital 
litigation as a whole.  Relying on the findings from both the frequentist and 
Bayesian analyses, we find that much of the decision to limit defense 
resources is explained by extralegal factors, including the attributes of the 
judge, the geographic placement of the federal judicial district and its 
surrounding punitive legal culture, and the nature of caseloads and case 
processing times in the district.  Only the complexity of the underlying charge 
presents an explanation in line with the null hypothesis, although even here 
none of the other variables reflecting case facts proved either correlative or 
causative.	  
VII.  LIMITATIONS & CONCLUSION 
There are multiple reasons to be modest in our claims.  Econometric 
modeling for this kind of data is challenging, due in part to the low statistical 
power of estimating logistic regressions on a sample size of sixty-two cases 
where only nineteen cases fall within the low-cost category of interest.  
Furthermore, the absence of data on the strength of evidence in these cases 
serves to reinforce the reminder that some of our findings are correlative and 
not reflective of causal processes.  Quantile and logistic regression on a 
sample size smaller than 100 should be interpreted with extreme caution, 
which is why we exhausted all possible avenues for supplementing and 
corroborating findings stemming from this portion of the analysis.  Our 
Bayesian estimates (which are more fitting for small N studies) supported a 
strong relationship between our independent variables and case cost, but still, 
these findings are far from decisive on the question of whether and to what 
extent the federal death penalty is problematically administered.  Even with 
 
166  Id. at 810–11. 
167  Id. at 823.  
168  Cover, supra note 165, at 682. 
169  Garland, supra note 168, at 823. 
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the expert interviews of federal judges and lawyers, we prefer to frame our 
results not as decisive findings but as exploratory red flags that underscore 
important follow-up questions regarding the integrity of the federal death 
penalty’s administration.	  
Elements of local punitive culture and subcultural behaviors of the 
courtroom workgroup may be operating earlier in the litigation process 
before the Attorney General decides to authorize a capital prosecution.  Yet, 
while the Attorney General considers the preferences of the local United 
States Attorney in seeking death, the formal decision to authorize any federal 
capital-eligible case is made in Washington D.C. and not in the physical 
space or among the actors of the courtroom workgroups across the ninety-
four federal judicial districts.170  For that matter, even if there were a local 
cultural effect in the authorization process, one can imagine it operating 
independently of the decision to provide defense resources at trial—
especially since the former decision is governed by prosecutors and the 
provision of resources is in the hands of judges.	  
A final caveat to our results concerns the time period and type of defense 
represented in our dataset.  Our findings are based upon the universe of all 
federal capital-authorized cases that went to trial during 1998–2004 in which 
a panel attorney was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act.  Although the 
large majority of federal capital defendants was represented by these panel 
attorneys and not by public defenders or private attorneys, it is possible—
indeed probable—that defendants in those other cases received a different 
level of resources, especially since federal public defenders have their own 
budgets and do not need to secure court approval for expert assistance.  For 
that matter, it is possible that federal capital practice has changed in the years 
following our data.  But at the mid-point of the modern death penalty, when 
federal capital prosecutions were at their height, our data suggest that there 
were significant, systematic differences in the level of defense support 
provided capital defendants that cannot be explained by legally cognizable 
facts.	  
Local legal culture and the specific qualities pertaining to the courtroom 
workgroup are under-specified and under-theorized concepts in the body of 
empirical literature surrounding capital punishment.  Whereas prior research 
has identified regional differences in capital case outcomes, we have sought 
to operationalize local legal culture and apply it to an earlier stage of the 
capital process—the resources made available to indigent defendants.	  
In a federal system in which the death penalty is presumably applied 
more consistently than across and between the states, we find a high degree 
 
170  Little, supra note 61, at 350. 
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of variation in defense resources, a variation that turns as much on subcultural 
expectations, attitudes, and actual practices as it does on legally cognizable 
case facts.  When those systemic and systematic differences are also 
correlated with the most serious case outcomes—death sentences—we 
believe there is cause for concern.  But, even if we read our results narrowly, 
we find that the local punitive culture, the background of the presiding judge, 
the caseload and speed of the court’s docket, and the race of the defendant 
influence the type of lawyer appointed and the level of resources defendants 
receive to defend themselves.  That these factors are extralegal, that they are 
linked to the lowest-level of defense resources, and that they stand between 
a defendant and his opportunity to defend against a death sentence, means 
that the consequences are real and quite troubling.	  
We welcome further research into these questions, including the variants 
of legal culture that influence court outcomes and the relationship between 
defense resources and case outcomes.  Ultimately, these questions reflect a 
larger, structural conflict embedded in federalism—whether it is possible to 
administer a uniform and unbiased federal death penalty system when 
courtroom actors cannot be kept in vacuum-sealed federal courthouses but 
instead are embedded in the cultural practices of their local areas and districts.  
That question falls beyond the scope of this study.  However, statistical 
methods paired with innovations in how we theorize about subcultural 
processes can help advance our understanding of the extent to which 
extralegal forces exist within a purportedly uniform system where both life 
and liberty are at stake.	  
